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Overriding Tribal Sovereignty by 
Applying the National Labor Relations 
Act to Indian Tribes in Soaring Eagle 




On July 1, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit decided Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB.1 
The three-judge panel unanimously concluded that the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA),2 a generally applicable federal 
statute,3 should not apply to Indian tribes.4  However, by a 2-1 
vote, the court held that the NLRA would apply to the tribally-
 
 †. J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School. Special thanks 
to the editors and staff of Law & Inequality for their comments and critiques in 
writing this Article.  I would also like to thank my parents, Joseph and Ramona 
Plumer, for their constant encouragement and belief that I can accomplish 
anything I put my mind to. 
 1. 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
 3. A generally applicable federal statute refers to a statute that appears to 
apply nationwide.  Jessica Intermill, Competing Sovereigns: Circuit Courts’ Varied 
Approaches to Federal Statutes in Indian Country, 62 FED. LAW. 64, 65 (Sept. 
2015), http://hogenadams.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/FedLawer-Article.pdf; 
see also Jeffrey M. Shaman, Rules of General Applicability, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 419 (2012).  The NLRA prohibits “employers” from engaging in unfair labor 
practices and gives the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) the authority to 
prevent such labor practices.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(1)–(2), 158(a), 160(a) (2012).  
The NLRA does contain an express exemption for federal, state, or local 
governments; employers who employ only agricultural workers; and employers 
subject to the Railway Labor Act (interstate railroads and airlines).  29 U.S.C. § 
152(2) (2012).  The NLRA, however, does not mention Indian tribes in either the 
statute’s text or its legislative history.  Id.  For purposes of Soaring Eagle, the 
Saginaw Chippewa Tribe of Michigan and the NLRB agree that the “NLRA is 
entirely silent with respect to Indians and Indian tribes.”  Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d 
at 658.  Other courts have assumed or concluded that the NLRA is a statute of 
general applicability.  See San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 
1306, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2007); NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 
F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 2003).  But see NLRB. v. Pueblo of San Juan, 280 F.3d 1278, 
1283 (10th Cir. 2000) (concluding that “the NLRA by its terms is not a statute of 
general application, it excludes states and territories”). 
 4. Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 669–70; id. at 675 (White, J. concurring and 
dissenting in part). 
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owned and operated casino by the Saginaw Chippewa Tribal 
Nation on reservation land.5  The Sixth Circuit ultimately 
determined that it was bound by its earlier decision in NLRB v. 
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Government, which it 
decided twenty-two days earlier.6 
In Little River, a Sixth Circuit panel concluded by a 2-1 vote 
that the tribal sovereignty of the Little River Band of Ottawa 
Indians did not preclude applying the NLRA to a tribally-owned 
casino located on reservation land.7  The Soaring Eagle court 
declared that Little River was wrongly decided, and explained that 
“if writing on a clean slate,” it would have instead followed 
Supreme Court precedent regarding the applicability of generally 
applicable laws to Indian tribes.8  The Soaring Eagle court added 
that, if it was not bound by Little River, it would have held that 
the NLRA—which does not contain any congressional intent to 
apply to Indian tribes—should not apply to tribes.9 
Following Little River and Soaring Eagle, the Little River 
Band of Ottawa Indians and the Saginaw Chippewa Tribal Nation 
petitioned to the Supreme Court of the United States to review the 
decisions.10  The tribes asked the Court to overturn the Sixth 
Circuit’s rulings and align the decisions with Supreme Court 
precedent.11  However, the Supreme Court declined to grant 
review of the cases to address the question of whether the NLRB 
has authority to assert jurisdiction on reservation land and solicit 
tribal casino employees to join labor unions.12 
 
 5. Id. at 662 (“[W]e must conclude in this case that the Casino operated by the 
Tribe on trust land falls within the scope of the NLRA, and that the NLRB has 
jurisdiction over the Casino.”). 
 6. 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 7. Id. at 555 (holding that applying the NLRA to the Little River Band “does 
not undermine the Band’s right of self-government in purely intramural matters, 
and we find no indication that Congress intended the NLRA not to apply to a tribal 
government’s operation of tribal gaming . . . .”). 
 8. Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 670 (“[I]f writing on a clean slate, we would 
conclude that . . . the Tribe has an inherent sovereign right to control the terms of 
employment with nonmember employees at the Casino . . . .”). 
 9. Id. 
 10. NLRB v. Little River of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 
2015), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 12, 2016) (No. 15-1024); Soaring Eagle 
Casino and Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed 
(U.S. Feb. 12, 2016) (No. 15-1034). 
 11. Little River, 788 F.3d 537, petition for cert. filed at 19; Soaring Eagle, 791 
F.3d 648, petition for cert. filed at 15. 
 12. See NLRB v. Little River of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537 (6th 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, (U.S. June 27, 2016) (No. 15-1024); Soaring Eagle Casino 
and Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied (U.S. June 27, 2016) 
(No. 15-1034). 
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Under longstanding principles of federal Indian law, the 
Supreme Court takes the position that Congress must clearly 
express its intent to limit tribal sovereignty or abrogate treaty 
rights.13  The Supreme Court has consistently applied the clear 
statement rule to determine whether federal statutes apply to 
Indian tribes.14  Under the Supreme Court’s analysis, a federal 
statute that is silent on its application to Indian tribes cannot 
undermine or limit tribal sovereignty or authorize suit against 
Indian tribes.15  The clear statement rule presumes that tribal 
sovereignty remains intact when a federal statute does not 
mention Indian tribes in its text or legislative history.16  In this 
context, the Supreme Court interprets congressional silence to 
mean that tribal sovereignty is not abrogated.17  Furthermore, the 
Court recognizes the unique nature of Indian tribes, and does not 
view tribes as private, voluntary organizations.18  In 2014, the 
Supreme Court declared the clear statement rule as “an enduring 
principle of Indian law: Although Congress has plenary authority 
 
 13. See, e.g., Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884) (“General acts of Congress 
[do] not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to 
include them.”). 
 14. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739–40 (1986) (stating that there 
must be “clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its 
intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to 
resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty”); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs 
Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 173–74 (1999) (applying the test to find 
that the “Chippewa’s usufructuary rights were not extinguished” because there was 
no “clear evidence” that Congress intended to abrogate the treaty rights); South 
Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687 (1993) (“Congress has the power to abrogate 
Indians’ treaty rights . . .  though we usually insist that Congress clearly express 
its intent to do so.”) (citations omitted); Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 380–81, 
392–93 (1976) (holding that an ambiguous federal statute did not grant the state of 
Minnesota the authority to collect tax on reservation land); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 
187 U.S. 553, 556, 566 (1903) (considering the ability of Congress to abrogate 
treaties with Indian tribes). 
 15. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (“Because the 
Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by 
the Federal Government, the proper inference from silence . . . is that the sovereign 
power . . . remains intact.”) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 
130, 149 n.14 (1982)). 
 16. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (“[A] proper 
respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress 
in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of 
legislative intent.”). 
 17. See Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18. 
 18. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 388; United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 
(1975) (stating that Supreme Court decisions “establish the proposition that Indian 
tribes within ‘Indian country’ are a good deal more than ‘private, voluntary 
organizations . . . .’”). 
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over tribes, courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact 
intends to undermine Indian self-government.”19 
The Sixth Circuit’s rulings in Little River and Soaring Eagle 
further widens a circuit split and conflicts with Supreme Court 
precedent on whether generally applicable federal statues, like the 
NLRA, apply to Indian tribes.20  In NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the clear statement 
rule to find that the NLRA did not prevent the Pueblo Tribe from 
applying its own “right-to-work law” on its own Indian 
reservation.21  The Tenth Circuit explained that when “tribal 
sovereignty is at stake, the Supreme Court has cautioned that ‘we 
tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative 
intent’” to abrogate tribal sovereignty.22 
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Soaring Eagle relies on dictum 
to determine its outcome, and applying the NLRA to the Tribe is 
inconsistent with fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty.23  
The decision in Soaring Eagle complicates existing case law, and 
provides the Supreme Court with an opportunity to address the 
applicability of generally applicable federal statutes to Indian 
tribes.24  In addition, the enactment of the Tribal Labor 
Sovereignty Act of 201525 by Congress, which would expressly 
 
 19. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031–32 (2014). 
 20. NLRB v. Little River of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537, 556 (6th 
Cir. 2015) (McKeague, J., dissenting); see also Intermill, supra note 3; Steve Biddle 
& Danielle Fuschetti, The Sixth Circuit Extends the NLRA’s Reach to Tribal-Owned 
Casinos, LITTLER INSIGHT (July 7, 2015), https://www.littler.com/files/2015_7_
insight_6th_circuit_extends_nlra_reach_tribal-owned_casinos.pdf (discussing the 
impact of the Little River and Soaring Eagle decisions and the need to clarify 
existing law on the issue); Kaighn Smith, Jr., Tribal Self-Determination and 
Judicial Restraint: The Problem of Labor and Employment Relations Within the 
Reservation, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 533–42 (2008) (discussing the circuit split 
in applying generally applicable federal labor and employment statutes to Indian 
tribes). 
 21. 276 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 22. Id. at 1195 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 
(1978)). 
 23. Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 675 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
 24. Intermill, supra note 3; see also Bryan H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law, 
Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413, 530–31 
(2007) (“Only an appeal to the Supreme Court would give th[e] Court the 
opportunity to rein in the Board and the lower courts.”); Richard A. Duncan, Toni 
M. Everton & Thomas J. Posey, A Look at 6th Circ[uit] Application of NLRA to 
Tribal Casino, LAW360 (July 9, 2015, 10:20 AM), http://www.faegrebd.com/
files/111300_A_Look_At_6th_Circ._Application_Of_NLRA_To_Tribal_Casino.pdf 
(stating that the circuit split on the issue of whether generally applicable statutes 
apply to tribes “appears ripe for Supreme Court review”). 
 25. On November 17, 2015, the United States House of Representatives passed 
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exclude tribes from the NLRA’s definition of employer, would also 
resolve the issue presented in Soaring Eagle. 
The focus of this Article is on the proper application of the 
NLRA and other generally applicable federal statutes to Indian 
tribes.  The analysis draws on case law discussing the unique 
status of Indian tribes within the United States and their 
longstanding relationship with the federal government.  In this 
context, this Article evaluates the application of general federal 
statutes to Indian tribes and the issue of tribal sovereignty in 
deciding whether the NLRA should encompass tribally-owned and 
operated enterprises. 
This Article argues that applying the NLRA to Indian tribes 
is inconsistent with fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty 
and Supreme Court precedent addressing the application of 
federal statutes to Indian tribes.  This Article further argues that 
the decision in Soaring Eagle conflicts with laws promoting the 
self-government of Indian tribes.  As a result, Soaring Eagle 
widens a circuit split on the correct approach to follow when 
interpreting the applicability of federal statutes to Indian tribes.  
Because of the circuit split and the existence of many other 
generally applicable federal statutes, which approach to follow 
when determining NLRA applicability to Indian tribes demands 
eventual Supreme Court review or Congressional implementation 
of an exception that expressly excludes tribes from the Act’s 
application. 
Part I provides a background on tribal sovereignty and 
inherent powers of Indian tribes.  Part II proceeds in two parts. 
Section A discusses background on the NLRA.  Section B discusses 
the varying approaches used by federal courts in applying 
generally applicable federal statutes to Indian tribes.  Section B 
includes a discussion on Supreme Court precedent and application 
of its clear statement rule.  Further, Section B argues that this is 
the correct approach courts should follow when applying generally 
applicable federal statutes to Indian tribes.  In addition, this 
section includes a discussion of approaches followed by lower 
courts when facing the same issue.  Finally, this section argues 
that the approaches followed by lower courts are misapplied, 
undermine sovereign powers possessed by tribes, and are 
 
H.R. 511, 114th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 2015), referred to as the Tribal Labor 
Sovereignty Act of 2015, which would expand the list of entities exempted from the 
NLRA’s definition of “employer” by adding “any Indian tribe, or any enterprise or 
institution owned and operated by an Indian tribe and located on its Indian lands.”  
161 CONG. REC. H8260, H8272 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2015). 
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inconsistent with Congress’s plenary power over tribes. Part III 
describes the factual and historical background of the Saginaw 
Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan. Part IV discusses the Sixth 
Circuit’s reasoning and ruling in Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort 
v. NLRB. 
I. Tribal Sovereignty and the Unique Status of Tribes 
Within the United States 
a. The United States Trust-Responsibility to Tribes 
The issue of whether generally applicable federal statutes 
that do not explicitly mention tribes in their text or legislative 
history should apply to tribes is complicated by the historical 
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes.26  
Before the formation of the United States, “tribes were self-
governing sovereign political communities.”27  Through treaties, 
Indian tribes came under the power of the federal government.28  
 
 26. See Vicki J. Limas, Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes 
to Native American Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681, 683–84 (1994); Ann Richard, Application of the National Labor 
Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act to Indian Tribes: Thwarting the 
Economic Self-Determination of Tribes, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 203, 205–07 (2005–
2006) (describing the trust relationship between the United States and Indian 
tribes); Intermill, supra note 3, at 65 (arguing that the “trust-responsibility” 
doctrine and the plenary power doctrine create foundational inconsistencies for 
federal Indian law principles); Brian P. McClatchey, Tribally-Owned Businesses 
Are Not “Employers”: Economic Effects, Tribal Sovereignty, and NLRB v. San 
Manuel Band of Mission Indians, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 127, 134, 140–41 (2006); San 
Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1056 (2004) (acknowledging 
that the Board’s decision in ruling on whether the NLRA applies to tribes is 
“difficult because Indian tribes occupy a unique position in the Nation’s political 
and legal history”). 
 27. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1978); McLanahan v. Ariz. 
State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (“It must always be remembered that 
the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that 
their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government.”); see also 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978) (“Upon incorporation 
into the territory of the United States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the 
territorial sovereignty of the United States and their exercise of separate power is 
constrained . . . .”); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 8 (Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (stating that 
tribes’ “rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, [are] necessarily 
diminished”). 
 28. For a discussion on treaties between the United States and Indian tribes, 
see STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 45–54 (4th ed. 2012); 
see also FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 5.01–5.04 (2005); 
Anna Wermuth, Union’s Gamble Pays Off: In San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 
The NLRB Breaks the Nation’s Promise and Reserves Decades-Old Precedent to 
Assert Jurisdiction Over Tribal Enterprises on Indian Reservations, 21 LAB. LAW. 
81, 82–84 (2005) (discussing treaties between the federal government and Indian 
tribes during the 1800s). 
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In exchange for land, the federal government made promises to 
Indian tribes, including agreements to set aside reservation land 
for tribes’ exclusive use, protection of tribal sovereignty, and 
preservation of the welfare of tribal members.29  These 
considerations given by the United States to Indian tribes form 
the basis of the trust-responsibility doctrine that has been 
characterized as a guardianship over tribes.30  In essence, this 
trust relationship imposes on the federal government the 
obligation to protect tribal property rights, preserve tribal self-
governance, and provide services to Indian tribes.31  The special 
relationship between Indian tribes and the United States is also 
grounded in longstanding Indian law principles.32 
The Supreme Court has performed a significant role in 
defining the unique relationship between the United States and 
Indian tribes.33  Although Indian tribes gave up their rights to the 
land they inhabited, the Supreme Court has explained that Indian 
tribes continue to exercise “inherent powers of a limited 
sovereignty.”34  In a series of cases decided by the Supreme Court 
in the 1820s and 1830s,35 Chief Justice Marshall discussed the 
legal status of Indian tribes within the United States, which 
became a foundational framework for federal Indian law.36  Justice 
 
 29. See PEVAR, supra note 28, at 46–47 (discussing exchanges between the 
United States and Indian tribes in the context of tribal treaties). 
 30. Limas, supra note 26, at 683–84 (discussing the “unique relationship 
between the federal and tribal governments.”); Richard, supra note 26, at 205–07 
(describing the trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes). 
 31. See MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW HORNBOOK 181–82 
(2016). 
 32. See Julie Thompson, Application of the National Labor Relations Act to 
Indian Tribes: Preserving Indian Self-Government and Economic Security, 27 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 189, 195–97 (2001) (discussing tribal sovereignty and the 
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes); COHEN, supra 
note 28, § 5.04[4][a], at 418 (“One of the basic principles in Indian law is that the 
federal government has a trust or special relationship with Indian tribes.”); 
WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 35 (5th ed. 2009) 
(“Much of American Indian Law revolves around the special relationship between 
the federal government and the tribes.”). 
 33. See CANBY, supra note 32, at 37–39 (discussing the evolution of the trust 
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes). 
 34. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (quoting FELIX COHEN, 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945)); see also United States v. Kagama, 
118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886) (stating that although tribes no longer possess “full 
attributes of sovereignty,” they remain a “separate people, with the power of 
regulating their internal and social relations . . .”). 
 35. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 
(1823). 
 36. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. 
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Marshall characterized Indian tribes as “domestic dependent 
nations” that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their 
members and territories.37 
In Worcester v. Georgia, Justice Marshall discussed Indian 
tribes’ inherent right to tribal sovereignty.38  The issue was 
whether the State of Georgia could impose its laws within the 
boundaries of the Cherokee reservation.39  The Supreme Court 
ruled that Georgia could not subject the Cherokee people to its 
laws within the reservation lands because the laws were 
preempted by the sovereign-to-sovereign relationship that existed 
between Indian tribes and the federal government.40  In his 
opinion, Justice Marshall stated: 
Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, 
independent political communities, retaining their original 
natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from 
time immemorial . . . .  The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct 
community occupying its own territory, with boundaries 
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no 
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, 
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in 
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of [C]ongress.41 
The Supreme Court continues to recognize the concept of 
inherent tribal sovereignty.42  The inherent powers of tribes are 
not powers delegated by Congress, but instead powers possessed 
“by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”43 
 
L. REV. 627 (2006) (explaining that the three opinions by Justice Marshall, referred 
to as the “Marshall Trilogy” identify the boundaries of Indian law as they remain 
today); Phillip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, 
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
381 (1993). 
 37. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2.  In Cherokee Nation, the Supreme Court held 
that the Cherokee Nation could not be regarded as a “foreign state” within the 
meaning of the United States Constitution.  Id. at 20. 
 38. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 580. 
 39. Id. at 516. 
 40. Justice Marshall concluded that Indian tribes are “nations as distinct 
political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority 
is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries . . . .” Id. at 
557. 
 41. Id. at 559–61. 
 42. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 698 (1993) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“It is a fundamental principle of federal Indian law that Indian tribes 
possess inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been 
extinguished.”) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978)). 
 43. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“Indian tribes still 
possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by 
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”). 
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As a sovereign government, the primary source of tribal 
rights is its right to govern itself.44  The tribal right of self-
government encompasses several functions, including: the power 
of tribes to determine their own form of tribal government,45 the 
power to determine tribal membership,46 the power to enact laws47 
and enforce laws within their forum,48 the power to tax,49 the 
power to establish a tribal court system,50 and the power to 
exclude non-members from tribal lands.51  In addition to these 
inherent tribal powers, Indian tribes retain the power of sovereign 
immunity from lawsuits, which enables tribes to avoid becoming a 
party to litigation without their consent or authorization by 
Congress.52  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explained that 
although the plenary power doctrine grants Congress the 
authority to authorize lawsuits against Indian tribes, a waiver of 
sovereign immunity must be clearly and unequivocally 
expressed.53 
Collectively, these inherent tribal powers enable Indian 
tribes to govern their own internal affairs and exercise authority 
 
 44. For a general discussion on tribal sovereign rights, see Limas, supra note 
26, at 685–90 (1994); see also COHEN, supra note 28, at 211–22 (discussing the 
extent of tribal powers over their members and territory); Smith, supra note 20, at 
510–13 (explaining attributes of tribal sovereignty and inherent powers of tribes). 
 45. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978) (explaining 
that tribes possess the power to determine their form of self-government, subject to 
restrictions placed on tribes by Congress). 
 46. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (stating that 
tribes “retain their inherent power to determine tribal membership . . . ”). 
 47. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 54 (“[Tribes] have power to make 
their own substantive law in internal matters . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 48. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012) (providing that tribes have criminal 
jurisdiction over tribal members that commit “major crimes” on reservation lands); 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 (1978) (explaining that 
tribes have criminal jurisdiction over non-members). 
 49. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982) 
(describing tribes’ power to tax as “an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty 
because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial 
management.  This power enables a tribal government to raise revenue for its 
essential services . . . .”). 
 50. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14–15 (1987) 
(recognizing that “[t]ribal courts play a vital role in tribal self-government . . . and 
the Federal Government has consistently encouraged this development”) (citations 
omitted). 
 51. See, e.g., Montana, 450 U.S. at 566–67 (holding that tribes may prohibit or 
place restrictions on nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land owned by Indian 
tribes or held in trust by the federal government). 
 52. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (“As a 
matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has 
authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.”). 
 53. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58–59 (1978). 
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over their members and territory.54  Additionally, these attributes 
of tribal sovereignty play an important role in promoting efforts to 
further tribal economic development and self-determination.55  
Through the operation of tribally-owned enterprises located on 
reservation lands, Indian tribes work to establish an economic 
means of supporting their tribal governmental affairs and 
becoming more self-sufficient sovereign nations.56  The Supreme 
Court has noted that “Congress has consistently reiterated its 
approval of the immunity doctrine” through authorizing limited 
classes of lawsuits against tribes, which “reflect[s] Congress’ [sic] 
desire to promote the ‘goal of Indian self-government, including its 
‘overriding goal’ of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic 
development.”57 
b. The Plenary Power Doctrine 
The plenary power doctrine appears to contradict the United 
States’ trust-responsibility to commit its national honor58 in 
fulfilling treaty responsibilities with tribes.59  The United States 
Constitution grants Congress general powers to legislate in 
regards to Indian tribes.60  Under the plenary power doctrine, the 
federal government can assert essentially unlimited authority over 
Indian tribes subject to the Constitution and its trust-
responsibility to the tribes.61  The Supreme Court has consistently 
held that although Indian tribes have inherent sovereign powers, 
 
 54. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983) 
(explaining that the sovereignty retained by tribes encompasses “the power of 
regulating their internal and social relations . . .”) (quoting United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886)). 
 55. Limas, supra note 26, at 690. 
 56. Id. at 691. 
 57. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 
U.S. 505, 510 (1991) (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 
U.S. 202, 216 (1987)). 
 58. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2324 (2011) 
(quoting Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 437 (1912)). 
 59. See Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Toward Consent and Cooperation: 
Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
507, 551–56 (1987). 
 60. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). 
 61. The Court in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) stated: 
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited 
character.  It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to 
complete defeasance.  But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their 
existing sovereign powers.  In sum, Indian tribes still possess those 
aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by 
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status. 
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Congress has authority to limit, modify, or eliminate the powers of 
self-government which the tribes otherwise possess.62 
The trust-responsibility doctrine and the plenary power 
doctrine create tension for courts to address the question of 
whether generally applicable federal statutes apply to Indian 
tribes.63  Although tribal treaties are the supreme law of the land64 
and the United States is under a trust-responsibility to tribes, 
Congress’s power to enact federal laws that preempt tribal law has 
the effect of undermining tribal sovereignty.65  For instance, 
applying the NLRA to tribally-owned enterprises located on 
reservation land abrogates both the tribes’ right to enact rules and 
the right to exclude individuals from reservation land.66  The right 
of self-government would be abrogated by preventing tribes from 
applying their own labor codes or from exercising jurisdiction to 
resolve labor dispute in their own tribal court systems.67  The right 
to exclude nonmembers would be impaired by denying tribes the 
authority to prohibit labor organizers from entering tribal lands.68 
II. Application of Federal Laws of General Applicability to 
Indian Tribes 
a. Background on the National Labor Relations Act 
Like most federal labor and employment statutes,69 the 
NLRA is silent with respect to its application to Indian tribes.70  
 
 62. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); Talton v. 
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896) (describing the power of tribal self-government 
limited by the “paramount authority of [C]ongress”). 
 63. See Intermill, supra note 3, at 65 (describing the tension between the trust-
responsibility and plenary power doctrines as “the root of the question” of whether 
courts choose to apply generally applicable federal statutes to Indian tribes). 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 65. See Intermill, supra note 3, at 65. 
 66. Id. at 66; see also Brief for Chickasaw Nation as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. NLRB, Docket No.13-01569 
(6th Cir. May 3, 2013), (Nos. 13-1569 and 13-1629), 2013 WL 10180847, at *27 
(“Applying the NLRA to Tribes . . . would abrogate their Treaty-protected rights of 
self-government by subjecting government operations to the continuing consent of 
their employees’ bargaining representatives.”). 
 67. Intermill, supra note 3, at 66. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, De Facto Judicial Preemption of Tribal 
Labor and Employment Law, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 435, 440–64 (2008); 
Thompson, supra note 32, at 191 (explaining that “several federal statutes that 
regulate many aspects of the employment relationship” do not expressly mention 
Indian tribes within the language of the statute). 
 70. See, e.g., NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 
F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The NLRA is a statute of general applicability and is 
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The NLRA ensures employees the right to self-organize, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively, and to 
engage in other activities.71  Additionally, the NLRA prohibits an 
“employer” from engaging in unfair labor practices.72  Under the 
NLRA, the term “employer” is defined as not including the “United 
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any 
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision 
thereof . . . .”73  The NLRA grants the NLRB the power to enforce 
and carry out its policies.74 
The Supreme Court has ruled that the NLRA permits States 
to regulate their labor relationships with public employees.75  In 
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of whether the NLRA applied to schools 
operated by church institutions.76  The Court determined that the 
NLRB’s jurisdiction is limited in the absence of a clear expression 
of congressional intent.77  The Court refused to construe the NLRA 
to apply to church-operated institutions in the absence of an 
affirmative intent by Congress.78 
b. Conflicting Approaches to Applying Generally Applicable 
Federal Statutes to Indian Tribes 
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to construe federal 
statutes to apply to Indian tribes without Congress’s clear intent 
to do so.79  This standard ensures that a law generally will not 
interfere with tribes’ inherent right to self-government unless 
Congress specifically intended to interfere in tribal affairs.80  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s approach closely adheres to the 
plenary power doctrine.81   Some courts facing the same issue have 
 
silent as to Indian tribes.”). 
 71. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2012). 
 72. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012) (stating that the NLRA empowers the Board 
to “prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting 
commerce”). 
 75. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 181 (2007) (citing 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152(2)). 
 76. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
 77. Id. at 500. 
 78. Id. at 506–07. 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986) (noting that 
Congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights was “strongly suggested” by 
the statute at issue). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (explaining that 
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applied an approach that begins with the presumption that 
generally applicable federal statutes should be applied to Indian 
tribes.82  Under this approach, courts are willing to accept the 
proposition that the NLRA applies to Indian tribes without 
congressional intent.83 
Part (i) of this section discusses the Supreme Court’s 
approach in applying federal statutes to Indian tribes, and argues 
that this precedent properly respects tribes’ sovereign rights.  Part 
(ii) discusses lower courts reliance on dictum in presuming that 
generally applicable federal statutes should apply to Indian tribes.  
Part (iii) discusses the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene framework that 
has led courts to find that generally applicable federal statutes 
apply to Indian tribes. 
 i. The Clear Statement Rule 
The Supreme Court has consistently applied the clear 
statement rule to determine that Congress may abrogate the 
inherent sovereign rights of tribes, but its intent to abrogate tribal 
rights must “be clear and plain.”84  Under this rule, the Supreme 
Court is “extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of 
treaty rights”85 and it does not construe statutes to abrogate treaty 
rights in a manner inconsistent with the intent of Congress.86  In 
various decisions, the Supreme Court has applied the clear 
statement rule to determine whether certain federal statutes 
abrogated tribal rights.87 
 
Congress has been granted broad general powers by the Constitution to legislate 
with respect to Indian tribes, and the Supreme Court has consistently described 
those powers as “plenary and exclusive”). 
 82. E.g. Donovan v. Coeur D’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 83. See, e.g., San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the NLRA applied to a casino owned and operated by 
the San Manuel Band of Serrano Mission Indians on its own reservation). 
 84. See, e.g., Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 99, 100 (1884) (“General acts of 
[C]ongress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an 
intention to include them.”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 
55 (1978); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221 (1958) (concluding that a clear 
statement of congressional intent is necessary to permit state civil or criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indian reservation activity); County of Yakima v. 
Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992). 
 85. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 
443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) (citing Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 
U.S. 404, 412–13 (1968)). 
 86. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412–13 (1968) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court “decline[s] to construe the Termination Act as 
a backhanded way [of] abrogating the hunting and fishing rights of these 
Indians.”). 
 87. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (“The power 
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In United States v. Dion, the Supreme Court unanimously 
concluded that in order to limit tribal sovereignty there must be 
evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its 
proposed action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the 
other, and then chose to resolve the conflict by abrogating the 
treaty.88  In Dion, the Court addressed the question of whether the 
Eagle Protection Act89 abrogated tribal members’ implied tribal 
treaty rights to hunt eagles on reservation land.90  The case 
involved a member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe who was 
prosecuted for killing four bald eagles while hunting on the Tribe’s 
reservation land in South Dakota.91  The Court noted that it has 
long required Congress to abrogate Indian treaty rights in a clear 
and plain manner because “treaty rights are too fundamental to be 
easily cast aside.”92 
The Dion court found compelling evidence to suggest that 
Congress intended to abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt 
eagles.93  The Court explained that the Act’s legislative history 
discussed the significance of eagle feathers for Indian religious 
ceremonies.94  The text of the statute also provided an express 
provision authorizing “the Secretary of the Interior to permit the 
taking, possession, and transportation of eagles ‘for the religious 
purposes of Indian tribes . . . .’”95  The Court construed this 
provision to mean that only the Secretary of the Interior had the 
authority to authorize Indians to hunt eagles, and the statute 
otherwise prohibits the hunting of eagles by Indians.96  This 
 
exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such 
power will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify 
the government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in 
the interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so.”); 
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687 (1993) (“Congress has the power to 
abrogate Indians’ treaty rights . . . though we usually insist that Congress clearly 
express its intent to do so.”). 
 88. 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986). 
 89. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1972). 
 90. Dion, 476 U.S. at 738. 
 91. Id. at 735. 
 92. Id. at 738. 
 93. Id. at 739–40 (“[W]here the evidence of congressional intent to abrogate is 
sufficiently compelling, ‘the weight of authority indicates that such an intent can 
also be found by a reviewing court from clear and reliable evidence in the 
legislative history of a statute.’”) (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW 223 (1982)). 
 94. Id. at 744. 
 95. Id. at 742. 
 96. Id. at 740 (“The provision allowing taking of eagles under permit for the 
religious purposes of Indian tribes is difficult to explain except as a reflection of an 
understanding that the statute otherwise bans the taking of eagles by Indians, a 
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reliable evidence in the statute’s text and legislative history were 
sufficient to support the determination that Congress, through the 
Eagle Protection Act, intended to abrogate tribal hunting rights 
within.97 
In NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan,98 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied the clear statement rule to 
resolve the issue of whether the NLRA precluded the Pueblo Tribe 
from applying its own government ordinance prohibiting union 
agreements.99  The Tenth Circuit determined that the Pueblo’s 
right-to-work ordinance was an exercise of its tribal sovereign 
authority, and that the NLRA would be construed to apply to the 
Tribe only if Congress intended.100  Because neither the language 
of the statute nor its legislative history mentions Indian tribes, the 
Tenth Circuit determined that congressional silence is not 
sufficient to undermine Indian tribes’ inherent authority to govern 
their own territory.101  The court further stated that the proper 
approach to follow is that congressional silence cannot serve to 
divest tribal power to govern their territory.102 
Similarly, in 2014, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the clear 
statement rule in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community to find 
that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) did not abrogate 
tribal sovereign immunity.103  The IGRA expressly abrogates tribal 
sovereign immunity under certain circumstances: suits by states 
“to enjoin a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and 
conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact . . . .”104  The 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the State of 
Michigan had the authority to bring suit against the Tribe’s 
gaming activities in violation of the Tribal-State compact taking 
 
recognition that such a prohibition would cause hardship for the Indians, and a 
decision that that problem should be solved not by exempting Indians from the 
coverage of the statute, but by authorizing the Secretary to issue permits to 
Indians where appropriate.”). 
 97. Id. at 739. 
 98. 276 F.3d 1186, 1200 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 99. Id. at 1192 (“In order to find preemption of tribal laws . . . it is necessary to 
determine whether Congress intended to divest the San Juan Pueblo of its power 
as a sovereign to pass right-to-work laws.”). 
 100. Id. at 1195 (holding that the court does not “lightly construe federal laws as 
working a divestment of tribal sovereignty and will do so only where Congress has 
made its intent clear that we do so”). 
 101. Id. at 1196. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2033 (2014). 
 104. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2012). 
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place off-reservation.105  The Bay Mills Indian Community 
purchased off-reservation land, and constructed and operated a 
casino on this land.106  The Supreme Court held Congress did not 
authorize the State of Michigan to bring this specific class of suits 
against the Tribe because the Tribe’s gaming operations were not 
on Indian lands.107  The Supreme Court explained that “a 
fundamental commitment of Indian law is judicial respect for 
Congress’s primary role in defining the contours of tribal 
sovereignty.”108  In conclusion, the Supreme Court refused to 
abrogate tribal sovereignty even though construing the statute as 
written resulted in an apparent anomaly that permits “a State to 
sue a tribe for illegal gaming inside, but not outside, Indian 
country.”109 
Dion and Bay Mills properly recognize and respect 
fundamental federal Indian law principles.110  The decisions 
illustrate the Supreme Court’s “deference to Congress’s plenary 
and exclusive role in imposing limits on tribal sovereignty.”111  The 
Supreme Court’s clear statement rule, used to test whether 
Congress abrogates tribal sovereignty reflects tribes’ unique legal 
status within the United States, and respects their inherent right 
to self-government.112  Furthermore, these decisions show the 
extent of evidence necessary to persuade the Supreme Court that 
Congress intended to impose limits on tribal sovereignty.113  The 
rule ensures that without reliable evidence of Congressional intent 
to justify abrogating tribes’ sovereign rights, the court must 
presume that Indian tribes continue to retain authority over their 
reservations.114 
 
 105. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2029. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 2032. 
 108. Id. at 2039. 
 109. Id. at 2033. 
 110. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 69, at 436–38 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s approach in determining when Congress intended to abrogate tribal rights). 
 111. NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indian Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537, 563 
(6th Cir. 2015) (McKeague, J., dissenting). 
 112. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 546 (1974) (acknowledging the 
“unique legal status of tribal and reservation-based activities”). 
 113. See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel 
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) (“Absent explicit statutory language, we have been 
extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights . . . .”). 
 114. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959). 
2016] Overriding Tribal Sovereignty 147 
 ii. Tuscarora Dictum 
Some lower courts have relied on a single statement made by 
the Supreme Court in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora 
Indian Nations115 to presume that generally applicable federal 
statutes should apply to Indian tribes.116  In Tuscarora, the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Federal Power 
Act (FPA) authorized the taking of off-reservation land owned by 
the Tuscarora Tribe in fee simple.117  To resolve the issue, the 
Court had to determine whether the FPA covered Indian tribes.118  
The Court applied the clear statement rule to find that Congress 
intended the FPA to cover lands owned by Indian tribes because it 
“defines and treats with lands occupied by Indians.”119  Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court determined that because the Tuscarora Tribe 
owned the fee land, the lands did not satisfy the statutory 
definition of “reservation,” and thus the federal government’s 
taking of the land was permitted.120 
In a statement not necessary to its holding and widely 
considered dictum,121 the Court declared that “it is now well-
settled by many decisions of this Court that a general statute in 
terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property 
interests.”122  The cases the Court cited to support this statement 
 
 115. 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
 116. For a discussion on the Supreme Court’s reasoning and outcome in 
Tuscarora, see Wildenthal, supra note 24; Wermuth, supra note 28, at 88–107; 
Intermill, supra note 3, at 66–67; William Buffalo & Kevin J. Wadzinski, 
Application of Federal and State Labor and Employment Laws to Indian Tribal 
Employers, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1365, 1379 (1995). 
 117. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 110 (describing the issue in the case as involving 
“whether the Tuscarora lands covered by the Commission’s license are a part of a 
‘reservation’ as defined and used in the Federal Power Act . . .”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 118. 
 120. Id. (“[The FPA] does not exclude lands or property owned by Indians, and, 
upon the authority of the cases cited, we must hold that it applies to these lands 
owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation.”). 
 121. See NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 
537, 557 (6th Cir. 2015) (McKeague, J., dissenting) (stating that the Tuscarora 
statement “was not essential” to the Court’s holding and “is in the nature of dictum 
and entitled to little precedential weight”); Mitchell Peterson, The Applicability of 
Federal Employment Law to Indian Tribes, 47 S.D. L. REV. 631, 642–44 (2002); San 
Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1071 n.61 (2004) (stating that 
the “language from Tuscarora is mere dictum premised on inapposite authority.”); 
Maureen M. Crough, A Proposal For Extension of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act to Indian-Owned Businesses on Reservations, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 473, 
486 (1985); COHEN, supra note 28, at 412 (“[The] statement was not part of the 
Court’s holding or necessary to it, because ample evidence supported the shaky 
foundation.”). 
 122. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 116. 
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involved income tax statutes that subjected “every individual” to 
income tax and did not exempt “either Indians or any other 
persons from their scope.”123  Because the Tuscarora Indian Nation 
owned the land at issue in fee simple and it was not within the 
meaning of a “reservation,” it was not necessary for the Supreme 
Court to analyze whether Congress intended the FPA to 
encompass Indian tribes.124  Despite making this statement, the 
Supreme Court did not overrule its longstanding rule that general 
acts of Congress should not be applied to Indian tribes unless 
there is a clear expression to the contrary.125  Lower courts have 
relied on the Court’s statement, however, made in the context of 
tax exemptions to create a presumption in favor of applying 
generally applicable federal laws to Indian tribes.126 
 iii. The Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene Rule 
In 1985, twenty-five years following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Tuscarora, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit decided Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm.127  
The Ninth Circuit adopted a new approach in applying generally 
applicable federal statutes to Indian tribes.128  The court began its 
analysis by adopting the Tuscarora presumption that the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) applied to a tribally-
owned and operated enterprise.129 The Ninth Circuit also agreed 
with the Tribe that the “language from Tuscarora is dictum,” but 
the court stated that “it is dictum that has guided many of our 
decisions.”130  To support this statement, the court cited to cases 
involving individual Indians, not Indian tribes.131  The Ninth 
Circuit further stated that it had not adopted the clear statement 
 
 123. See id. at 116–17. 
 124. See NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 
537, 558 (6th Cir. 2015) (McKeague, J., dissenting) (“The Tuscarora Court did not 
have to define the scope of the Federal Power Commission jurisdiction in the face of 
congressional silence . . . .”). 
 125. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024. 2033 (2014). 
 126. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 28, at 128–29; D. Michael McBride, III & H. 
Leonard Court, Labor Regulation, Union Avoidance and Organized Strategies on 
Tribal Lands: New Indian Gaming Strategies in the Wake of San Manuel Band of 
Indians v. National Labor Relations Board, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1259, 1287 
(2007) (describing courts’ willingness to apply federal labor and employment laws 
to tribes in the absence congressional intent). 
 127. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 128. See Intermill, supra note 3, at 67 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of 
the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene framework and its influence on other courts). 
 129. Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1115–16. 
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rule.132  Instead, under the Ninth Circuit’s framework, a federal 
law, if silent on the issue of applicability to Indian tribes, will not 
apply to them,” unless one of three exceptions is met: 
(1) the law touches “exclusive rights of self-governance in 
purely intramural matters”; (2) the application of the law to 
the tribe would “abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian 
treaties”; or (3) there is proof by legislative history or some 
other means that Congress intended [the law] not to apply to 
Indians on their reservations . . . .” In any of these situations, 
Congress must expressly apply a statute to Indians before we 
will hold that it reaches them.133 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Coeur d’Alene has established 
a strong presumption that generally applicable federal statutes 
should be applied to Indian tribes.134  The Second, Seventh, Ninth, 
and Eleventh circuits have applied the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene 
framework to determine whether generally applicable federal 
statutes apply to Indian tribes.135  Accordingly, courts have found 
that some federal labor and employment statutes should be 
applied to Indian tribes.136 This analytical framework has also led 
the NLRB to alter its stance on the applicability of the NLRA to 
Indian tribes.137 
In 2004, in San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB, 
the San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino brought suit after the 
Board overturned its own precedent by ruling that the Casino, a 
tribally-owned casino on reservation land, was subject to the 
NLRB’s jurisdiction under the NLRA.138 Originally in 1976, the 
 
 132. Id. at 1116 (stating that it had not “adopted the proposition that Indian 
tribes are subject only to those laws of the United States expressly made applicable 
to them”). 
 133. Id. (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893–94 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
 134. See Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. 
L. REV. 691, 706 (2005) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Donovan v. 
Coeur d’Alene “establishes a rebuttable presumption stacked against tribal 
interests”). 
 135. See Intermill, supra note 3; Duncan, supra note 24. 
 136. See Wildenthal, supra note 24, at 455; Singel, supra note 134, at 691 
(stating that the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene framework has been applied by six 
courts of appeals without review by the Supreme Court). 
 137. See San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1055 (2004). 
 138. The Board stated: 
For almost 30 years, the Board has wrestled with the question of whether 
the Act applies to the employment practices of this Nation’s Indian tribes.  
During that time, the Indian tribes and their commercial enterprises have 
played an increasingly important role in the Nation’s economy.  As tribal 
businesses have grown and prospered, they have become significant 
employers of non-Indians and serious competitors with non-Indian owned 
businesses.  This case requires the Board to accommodate Federal labor 
policy and Federal Indian policy in deciding whether to assert jurisdiction, 
under the Act, over tribal enterprises.   
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Board in Fort Apache Timber Co. v. NLRB first ruled that the 
tribally-owned enterprises located on Indian reservations were 
implicitly exempt as “employers” under the NLRA’s coverage.139  
Relying on established Indian law principles, the Board held that 
a timber company owned by the White Mountain Apache Tribe on 
reservation land was immune from “federal intervention, unless 
Congress has specifically provided to the contrary.”140  In reaching 
its decision, the Board noted that a tribal council on a reservation 
should be treated as a government by Congress and courts.141  In 
other decisions, the Board ruled that tribally-owned enterprises 
operated on reservation lands were “governmental entities” that 
were “political subdivisions,” exempt from the NLRA’s definition of 
“employer.”142 
The Board in San Manuel reversed its prior decisions in 
finding for the first time that, as a statute of “general application,” 
the NLRA should be applied to Indian tribes.143 The Board 
adopted the proclaimed “well established” Tuscarora presumption 
to determine that Congress intended the NLRA to have the 
“broadest possible breadth permitted under the Constitution.”144  
The Board reasoned that because the NLRA did not expressly 
exclude tribes from its coverage, Congress decided to encompass 
Indian tribes within the meaning of the Act.145  The Board applied 
the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene framework to determine whether 
tribal sovereignty precluded the application of the NLRA to 
tribes.146  The Board considered whether the assertion of 
jurisdiction over the Tribe would “touch exclusive rights of self-
governance in purely intramural matters” similar to “tribal 
membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations.”147  The 
Board found that because the casino substantially affected 
interstate commerce and many of the casino’s employees were not 
 
Id. at 1056.  See also McBride & Court, supra note 126 (discussing the San 
Manuel decision); Singel, supra note 134; Wildenthal, supra note 24. 
 139. Fort Apache Timber Co. v. NLRB, 226 N.L.R.B. 503, 506 (1976) (concluding 
that the “Tribal Council, and its self-directed enterprise on the reservation that is 
here asserted to be an employer, are implicitly exempt as employers within the 
meaning of the Act”). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Singel, supra note 134, at 694 (discussing the Board’s reluctance to 
apply the NLRA to Indian tribes in several cases). 
 143. See San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1063 (2004). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1063. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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tribal members, the operation of a casino was not an exercise of 
self-governance.148  Ultimately, the Board determined that it could 
properly assert jurisdiction over the Tribe’s casino on reservation 
land.149 
In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision in San Manuel by finding 
that applying the NLRA to the Tribe was justified.150  The D.C. 
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court’s statement in Tuscarora is 
“possibly dictum.”151  Furthermore, the court stated that the 
Board’s decision in San Manuel failed to consider the Tribe’s 
interests in exercising its essential self-government functions, 
including its power to regulate labor relations and power to 
exclude non-members from its lands.152  Following this decision, 
the NLRB continued to assert jurisdiction over Indian tribes, 
including the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan.153 
III. Background on the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of 
Michigan 
The Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan is a 
federally recognized Indian tribe that resides on the Isabella 
Indian Reservation in Mount Pleasant, Michigan.154  Through 
treaties with the federal government, the Tribe ceded land to the 
United States.155  In an 1855 treaty, the bands of the Saginaw, 
Swan Creek, and Black River ceded lands to the United States.156  
Under another treaty in 1864, additional lands reserved to the 
bands under the 1855 treaty were relinquished.157  Under the 1864 
treaty, the Isabella Reservation was designated “for the exclusive 
use, ownership, and occupancy” of the Saginaw Chippewa 
Indians.158  These treaties grant the Tribe the authority to govern 
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itself and exclude individuals from the lands located within the 
reservation.159  The Tribe currently has over 3,000 members.160  
The Tribe makes decisions through a twelve-member tribal 
council, which is elected by the tribal members.161  The tribal 
council governs and manages economic development for the 
Saginaw Tribe, and enacts laws applicable to tribal members.162 
In 1993, the Saginaw Tribe entered into a gaming compact 
with the state of Michigan to conduct gaming operations on the 
Isabella Reservation in accordance with the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA).163  As required by IGRA, the Saginaw 
Tribe uses its gaming revenue for self-governance, to discharge 
essential government functions, and to provide economic 
opportunities for tribal members and others.164  Similar to many 
Indian tribes across the country, gaming continues to function as 
an important economic development tool for the Saginaw Tribe.165  
The casino generates approximately $250 million in gross annual 
revenues by drawing in roughly 20,000 customers each year.166  
The Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort produces the Tribe’s primary 
income source, with its gaming operations generating 
approximately ninety percent of its overall income.167  The Tribe’s 
gaming revenue is used primarily to fund its 37 governmental 
departments and 159 tribal programs.168  Some of the Tribe’s 
departments include health administration, social services, tribal 
police and fire departments, utilities, a tribal court system, and 
education for tribal members.169 
Soaring Eagle Casino employs approximately 3,000 
employees, seven percent of whom are tribal members.170  The 
Saginaw Tribe adopted and implemented an employee handbook, 
which includes a no-solicitation policy that prohibits casino 
employees from engaging in solicitation related to union 
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activities.171  The dispute in Soaring Eagle arose when the 
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and 
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (Union) filed a 
complaint against the Tribe with the NLRB.172  The complaint was 
filed on behalf of a non-tribal member employee of the Soaring 
Eagle Resort and Casino.173  The complaint alleged that the Tribe 
violated § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA because of its a no-solicitation policy 
and banning of employee discussion of union activities at the 
casino.174  The Tribe moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction contending that the NLRA did not apply to the Tribe’s 
activities as a sovereign.175  Additionally, the Tribe argued that 
the Board could not assert jurisdiction over the Soaring Eagle 
Casino located on the Isabella Reservation.176 
On March 26, 2012, in an administrative adjudication, the 
NLRB held that the NLRA applied to the Tribe’s gaming 
operations and, as a result, it concluded that it had jurisdiction to 
review the merits of the complaint.177 
IV. Analysis of Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. National 
Labor Relations Board 
a. The Sixth Circuit’s Reliance on Little River to Find that 
the NLRB Has Jurisdiction on Indian Reservation Land 
In Soaring Eagle, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the NLRB’s 
order prohibiting the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe from 
applying its own tribally-enacted no-solicitation policy against 
employees at the Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort.178  The Sixth 
Circuit indicated that it was bound by its earlier decision in Little 
River even though it did not agree with the majority’s adoption of 
the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene framework or its analysis of tribal 
sovereignty.179 
In Little River, the majority affirmed the NLRB’s decision 
that the NLRA could apply to the casino resort operated by the 
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Little River Band of Ottawa Indians within its reservation on 
trust land.180  The majority opinion adopted the Tuscarora-Coeur 
d’Alene framework applied by the Ninth Circuit for interpreting 
generally applicable federal statutes to Indian tribes because it 
“accommodates principles of federal and tribal sovereignty.”181  
The Sixth Circuit rejected the Tribe’s argument that the NLRA 
could not be applied to Indian tribes “without a clear expression 
from Congress.”182  The court reasoned that, because many of the 
casino employees are not tribal members,183 a clear statement of 
congressional intent to apply the NLRA to Indian tribes is not 
required in all circumstances.184  Instead, the Sixth Circuit applied 
the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene framework to presume the NLRA 
applies to Indian tribes and analyze whether any of the three 
exceptions in the test were implicated.185 
The Little River court found that applying the NLRA to the 
Tribe did not implicate its inherent right of self-governance.186  
First, the Sixth Circuit determined that the application of the 
NLRA to the Tribe did not undermine its ability to generate 
revenue through the casino’s operation and fund its 
government.187  The court reasoned that the Tribe’s right to 
operate commercial enterprises without restrictions imposed by 
the federal government is not a feature of self-government, and 
the Tribe is not protected from statutes that “may incidentally 
affect the revenue streams of tribal commercial operations that 
fund tribal government.”188  Second, the Sixth Circuit found that 
applying the NLRA to the Tribe did not undermine the Tribe’s 
right to enact its own regulations because the Tribe’s regulation 
encompasses the activities of both members and nonmember 
employees of the casino.189  Accordingly, the court determined that 
the NLRA applies to the Little River Tribe because Indian tribes 
fit within the NLRA’s definition of “employer.”190 
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In his Little River dissent, Judge McKeague criticized the 
majority’s reasoning: 
The sheer length of the majority’s opinion, to resolve the single 
jurisdictional issue before us, betrays its error.  Under 
governing law, the question presented is really quite simple.  
Not content with the simple answer, the majority strives 
mightily to justify a different approach.  In the process, we 
contribute to a judicial remaking of the law that is authorized 
neither by Congress nor the Supreme Court.  Because the 
majority’s decision impinges on tribal sovereignty, encroaches 
on Congress’s plenary and exclusive authority over Indian 
affairs, conflicts with Supreme Court precedent, and unwisely 
creates a circuit split, I respectfully dissent.191 
Echoing the dissent in Little River, the Soaring Eagle court 
determined that the legal framework applied by the Little River 
panel wrongfully shifts the analysis away from a broad respect for 
tribal sovereignty and the application of the clear statement rule 
as a requirement to abrogate that sovereignty.192  Despite the 
disagreement, the Soaring Eagle panel was bound by its holding 
in Little River and reached the same conclusion in the matter 
involving the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe.193  The court 
rejected the Little River panel’s reasoning in adopting the Coeur-
d’Alene framework, proposing that it would have mandated the 
opposite outcome.194 
The Soaring Eagle court then adopted its own approach in 
determining whether the NLRA applies by considering whether 
applying the Act “impinges on the Tribe’s control over its own 
members and its own activities.”195  The court determined that an 
employee working for a tribally-owned and operated casino 
presents a consensual commercial relationship.196  Therefore, the 
court concluded that nonmember casino employees should be 
subject to the Saginaw Tribe’s no-solicitation policy.197  In 
conclusion, the majority reasoned that, if not for its ruling in Little 
River, “we would conclude that, keeping in mind ‘a proper respect 
both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of 
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Congress in this area,’ . . . . [the NLRA] should not apply to the 
Casino and should not render its no-solicitation policy void.”198 
b. The NLRB’s Arguments to Support Jurisdiction Over 
Indian Tribes Are Unfounded 
In opposing Supreme Court review of Soaring Eagle, the 
NLRB argued that there is no clear circuit split on the issue of 
applying generally applicable federal statutes to Indian tribes.199  
The NLRB itself recognizes that the Sixth and Tenth Circuit 
Courts take different analytical approaches to reach contrary 
conclusions regarding the applicability of the NLRA to Indian 
tribes.200  The NLRB, however, attempts to distinguish the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Pueblo of San Juan on the grounds that, in its 
opinion, the court addressed the Tribe’s authority when acting in 
its “sovereign” capacity, as opposed to its “proprietary” capacity.201  
In Soaring Eagle, all three judges on the panel emphasized that 
the Tenth Circuit rejected the analytical approach applied by the 
Sixth Circuit.202  In addition, Judge McKeague stated in his Little 
River dissent that the Tenth Circuit had “considered . . . and 
definitively rejected” the same arguments accepted by the Little 
River majority.203 
The NLRB’s justification for asserting jurisdiction on casinos 
located on reservation land is inconsistent with Supreme Court 
precedent.204  The NLRB argues that the NLRA applies to Indian 
tribes because tribes are not expressly exempt from the definition 
of “employer.”205  However, this argument directly conflicts with 
the clear statement rule, which mandates that Congress 
“unequivocally express” its intent to abrogate tribal sovereignty.206  
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Applying the NLRA to Indian tribes in this manner has the effect 
of singling out tribes as the only domestic sovereign subject to the 
provisions of the NLRA.207  The correct inference from 
congressional silence in the text and legislative history of the 
NLRA in regards to Indian tribes is the presumption that 
Congress never intended to abrogate tribal sovereignty.208 
The NLRB also argued that the question of whether the 
NLRA applies to Indian tribes should be left to Congress to 
resolve.  On November 17, 2015, the United States House of 
Representatives passed the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2015, 
which would expand the list of entities exempt from the NLRA’s 
definition of “employer” to include Indian tribes.209  A legislative 
fix by Congress to resolve the issues regarding the applicability of 
the NLRB outlined in the Little River and Soaring Eagle decisions 
now represents a favorable option for Indian tribes to pursue.210 
Conclusion 
The Soaring Eagle decision approves of applying the NLRA 
to Indian tribes in a way that has not been accepted by the 
Supreme Court or justified by Congress’s plenary power of Indian 
tribes.211  The Soaring Eagle court acknowledged the current 
circuit split on the issue of whether generally applicable statutes 
should apply to Indian tribes.212  Following the Supreme Court’s 
decision to decline review of Little River and Soaring Eagle, the 
question of whether the NLRA permits the NLRB to assert its 
jurisdiction on casinos owned and operated by Indian tribes 
located on reservation land remains unresolved. 
The approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in Soaring Eagle 
ignores the importance of tribal sovereignty and tribes’ unique 
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historical status within the United States.  The decision 
undermines tribes’ retained rights to regulate matters involving 
self-government.213  It intrudes on tribal rights “to undertake and 
regulate economic activity within the reservation”214 and on the 
longstanding right of tribes to make and enforce their own laws 
within their own reservation.215  By permitting the NLRB to assert 
jurisdiction on reservation land, the rights of Indian tribes to 
regulate their own labor affairs cannot be accomplished.216  
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling also infringes on tribes’ 
rights to place restrictions on nonmembers from entering 
reservation land.217 
In addition, the Soaring Eagle decision encroaches on 
Congress’s exclusive and plenary power over Indian affairs.218  The 
longstanding rule is that tribes retain their inherent sovereign 
powers until Congress expresses a clear and unequivocal intent to 
relinquish tribal rights.219  The Supreme Court has consistently 
refrained from finding that tribal rights have been abrogated 
without a clear finding of congressional intent.  The Supreme 
Court’s clear statement rule operates to avoid permitting courts to 
make interpretative questions that would be more appropriately 
addressed through the legislative process.220  Construing generally 
applicable federal statutes to apply to Indian tribes in the absence 
of congressional intent, has the effect of “strip[ping] Indian tribes 
of their retained inherent authority to govern their own 
territory.”221 
Eventually, the Supreme Court may take the opportunity to 
address the issue presented to the Sixth Circuit in Soaring Eagle.  
For now, the enactment of the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 
2015, which would exclude Indian tribes from the NLRA’s 
definition of “employer” would be a resolution to the issue 
presented to the Sixth Circuit in Soaring Eagle.  The unique and 
historical nature of Indian tribes demands that tribal sovereignty 
be preserved in the context of applying federal statutes to tribes.  
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Ultimately, Indian tribes across the nation have a strong interest 
in retaining their independence and the right to self-government 
over their territory and members to the greatest extent possible. 
